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Daniel K. Elwell's FAA covers up another failure
https://www.wsj.com/articles/faa-launches-probe-of-boeings-safety-analyses-1542154515
FAA Launches Review of Boeing’s Safety Analyses
Action comes in response to last month’s Lion Air jet crash
Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com,
and Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com,
Boeing’s Problematic Flight-Control Feature: What We Know
The system that helps prevent Boeing’s new 737 Max 8 plane from stalling is potentially linked to the fatal Lion Air
jet crash in Indonesia. The WSJ’s Robert Wall explains what we know about the safety feature.
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By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com,
and Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com,
Updated Nov. 13, 2018 11:05 p.m. ET
U.S. aviation regulators have launched a high-priority review of the safety analyses Boeing Co. BA -2.11% performed over the
years—and what information it distributed to airlines—regarding potential hazards associated with a new automated
flight-control system introduced on the latest versions of workhorse 737 aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Administration, after roughly two weeks of declining to comment on any facet of last month’s Lion
Air jet crash in Indonesia, which killed all 189 people on board and involved a 737 MAX 8, released a statement Tuesday saying
it was reviewing details surrounding the safety data and conclusions the Chicago plane maker previously provided the agency
as part of certifying 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9 models.
The statement also indicated that agency officials are looking into training requirements for pilots.
The review is part of the overall investigation into the Lion Air crash.
Signaling that future regulatory action and generally stepped-up oversight of Boeing’s risk-assessment procedures are
coming, the statement said, “the FAA and Boeing continue to evaluate the need for software and/or other design changes,”
including “operating procedures and training as we learn from the ongoing” crash probe headed by Indonesian authorities.
The statement is the clearest sign yet of internal FAA concerns stemming from preliminary clues about why the twin-engine
aircraft plunged in the Java Sea at a steep angle and high speed.
A Boeing spokesman said, “While we can’t discuss specifics of an ongoing investigation, we have provided two updates
for our operators around the world that re-emphasize existing procedures for these situations.”
When Boeing opted to install the new flight-control feature, according to government officials, the company concluded it was
virtually impossible for a combination of sensor failure, pilot actions and automated nose-down commands by the new system
to result in a serious safety hazard.
But now, with preliminary crash data indicating the plane experienced just such a sequence of events before crashing, the
company’s risk analyses and decision making are under heightened public scrutiny. So, too, is the oversight of the FAA,
which agreed to allow three U.S. airlines start flying the new models without Boeing providing cockpit crews or airline officials
details about how the new flight-control system operates and what risks it may pose under unusual circumstances, by automatically
and strongly pushing down an aircraft’s nose.
Investigators haven’t determined the cause of the Lion Air crash, and safety experts cautioned it is too early to tell
precisely how large a role the new flight-control system played in the tragedy. But as more clues emerge and crash investigators
delve deeper into design issues and the interplay of various computerized systems and cockpit displays, more of the focus
is shifting to the assumptions of those initial Boeing safety assessments.
More than 200 737 MAX planes have been delivered to airlines worldwide, including U.S. carriers Southwest Airlines, American
Airlines and United Airlines. That represents a fraction of the thousands of 737s in use.
Indonesian investigators are still searching for the plane’s cockpit-voice recorder, which could contain vital information
about what the pilots saw and did as they wrestled with a suspected flurry of sometimes conflicting electronic warnings, unreliable
air-speed displays and a seemingly uncontrollable aircraft gaining speed as it hurtled toward the water. Investigators and
safety experts have said that after a certain point, the crew may have had only seconds to react appropriately.
A Nov. 10 memo from Southwest management to its pilots, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, indicated Boeing omitted
information from flight manuals about the new flight-control system because pilots weren’t likely to find themselves
in situations involving some of its features. The flight control system, among other things, is intended to prevent pilots
from stalling the aircraft.
Shortcomings in Boeing’s risk-analysis procedures previously prompted major regulatory, financial and public relations
headaches for the company. It initially failed to recognize or counteract potentially fire-prone rechargeable lithium batteries
installed on Boeing’s flagship 787 aircraft. All of the jets were temporarily grounded until Boeing and the FAA agreed
on a foolproof fix.
Pilots unions have complained publicly that before the Lion Air plane went down, they hadn’t received any meaningful
information or training regarding the new flight-control system.
In the past, Boeing has had other instances when it wasn’t fully transparent with pilots. When the company revised some
software years ago to prevent crews of some 767 models from accidentally slamming aircraft tails on the runway during takeoff,
it didn’t inform pilots about the change, according to one person familiar with the details.
Besides the specifics of the safety reviews connected to the Lion Air crash, the accident could have broader implications
for the way the FAA approves new aircraft models and the complex computer systems that increasingly control equipment on board.
The agency for some time has been moving to delegate more responsibility to plane and equipment manufacturers for conducting
detailed risk assessments on new or derivative products. Congress has been pushing FAA leaders in the same direction, partly
to save federal dollars and partly to speed and streamline regulatory requirements for industry.
But the Lion Air crash is bound to rev up debate over whether the FAA granted Boeing excessive leeway—and then failed
to independently validate the company’s conclusions—regarding potential unintended consequences and hazards with
the new flight-control system.
In its Tuesday statement, the FAA said it is currently reviewing each of the individual safety assessments Boeing performed
and then passed on to the FAA, covering each computerized system that receives data from what is called an angle-of-attack
indicator. Those sensors, one of which is suspected of malfunctioning on the flight that crashed, measure the angle at which
a plane’s nose and wings are raised or lowered. Incorrect angle-of-attack data can result in faulty airspeed displays,
false stall warnings and other problems that could be misinterpreted by pilots.
Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com
Appeared in the November 14, 2018, print edition as 'FAA Reviews Boeing Safety Data on New Jet.'
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